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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs-




BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a conviction of murder in 
the second degree. The case was tried before a jury, the 
Honorable Judge J. Robert Bullock, presiding* 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was charged with the crime of murder 
in the second degree, a violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
76-50-1 (1953), as amended, a jury returned a verdict of 
guilty and a sentence of from five years to life imprison-
ment was imposed. Appellant now appeals from that 
conviction. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmance of the judgment of 
the lower court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In the early morning of August 19, 1972, a 
twenty-five year old woman was shot and killed. Barbara 
Ann Owens was a waitress at a cocktail lounge in Orem, 
Utah. She lived at Alpine Villa Hotel with Billy Jo 
Robinson, a/k/a Black, appellant in this case. Apparently 
the two had only recently arrived in the Provo-Orem area. 
On the night of August 18, 1972, Barbara Owens 
worked the late shift at the lounge. She was seen leaving 
with Billy Jo Robinson at approximately Is 00 afint Billy 
Jo had spent that evening at the lounge playing pool. Earlier 
in the evening Miss Owens spent time dancing with another 
male patron. This incident was the source of a heated 
argument between Ms. Owens and the appellant after they 
left the lounge. They arrived at their room, about 1:15 
a.m. A neighbor overheard angry quarreling concerning the 
incident at the lounge. He heard slapping, hitting, crying, 
threats by the man to 8,kill you both," and eventually, gun 
fire. Barbara was shot in the head with a .22 caliber pistol. 
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Appellant put her in her car and drove her to the hospital, 
where she was pronounced dead on arrival. Two policemen 
followed appellant to the hospital, as he was driving in 
excess of the speed limit. After Miss Owens was pronounced 
dead, appellant was placed in custody for questioning. At 
an opportune moment, however, he slipped out of the hospital 
and fled the state. 
Appellant testified at trial that there had been 
an argument but that the shooting was accidental. He 
claimed that while he was packing his gun, it discharged, 
hitting and killing Miss Owens. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THERE IS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD TO 
SUSTAIN A CONVICTION OF MURDER IN THE SECOND DEGREE. 
Appellant claims that the court erred in denying 
his motion for acquittal based on lack of evidence. The 
record, however, provides sufficient evidence to support 
the conviction and the denial of appellantfs motion. 
Appellant was convicted of second degree murder. 
This is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice 
aforethought. It does not require premeditation. 
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The evidence in this case is, for the most part, 
circumstantial. There were no eye-witnesses, etc. But 
the evidence is, nonetheless, sufficient to support a 
guilty verdict. It is the jury's province to weigh the 
evidence and draw reasonable inference therefrom. A 
review of the record shows that one could indeed reason-
ably conclude appellant's guilt from the evidence and 
testimony presented at trial. Mrs. Merrot, Miss Owens1 
employer, testified that before leaving the lounge on the 
morning of her death, Barbara asked if she could come to 
work the next night with a black eye (Tr.29). She gave 
no further explanation, but apparently suspected trouble 
with her boyfriend, Billy Jo, over the dancing incident 
(Tr.30). Barbara then left the lounge in the company of 
Billy (Tr.28,38). They arrived at their apartment 
(hotel) at approximately 1:15 a.m. (Tr.122). A quarrel 
ensued (Tr.122). Mr. Johansen, a man occupying the 
room next door, was awakened by the fight. He heard 
yelling and screaming between a woman and a man named 
Billy (Tr.122). They were arguing over the woman dancing 
with another man (Tr.122). There was considerable hitting 
and slapping during the quarrel (Tr.122). The woman, 
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pleaded with Billy to stop (Tr.122). At one point in 
the fight he threatened to "kill you both." (Tr.122). 
He then announced that he was leaving and ordered the 
woman to pack his things (Tr.122).. Mr. Johansen then heard 
a gun shot (Tr.123). The shot was followed by the shuffle 
of feet (Tr.123) and the opening and closing of a car door 
(Tr.123). Mr. Johansen looked out the window and observed 
a car pull out and drive away (Tr.123). 
Appellant also testified that there was an 
argument. He admitted that there was slapping but avowed 
that there was no "hitting" with fists or other objects 
(Tr.160). He also testified that at one point during the 
fight he ripped Miss Owens1 brassiere off (Tr.159). 
Dr. Rich, deputy medical examiner for the State 
Department of Health, gave testimony contradicting appel-
lant's statements. He testified that an extensive, external 
examination of the deceased's body revealed numerous bruises 
over her back, chest, breasts,arms and shoulders (Tr.46). 
He testified that these bruises were recent, less than 72 
hours old (Tr.47), probably within 24 hours (Tr.48). There 
was also a distinct mark on her back, a little over two 
inches long (Tr.48). As to the cause of the mark, Dr. 
Rich testified: 
"My immediate opinion, that 
perhaps some sort of belt . . . 
some sort of western belt with some 
kind of rivet . . . with some sort 
of protruding decoration*" (Tr.48) 
Mrs. Merrot testified that appellant was wearing such a 
belt buckle the night of the killing (Tr.159). Appellant 
testified that it was probably the brassiere strap that 
occasioned the mark on Barbara's back (Tr.159). Dr. Rich 
was asked if this was a plausible explanation. He stated 
that he did not believe the bra could cause such markings: 
"I've not seen this particular pattern caused by a brassiere." 
(Tr.53). From the testimony of Dr. Rich it is clear that 
Miss Owens was severely beaten, apparently not only by 
someone's hands, but with a belt. The argument between 
appellant and the deceased was not a minor confrontation 
as appellant's testimony suggests. The evidence supports 
a violent, physical fight where direct threats were made 
(Tr.122). 
When questioned by police at the hospital, 
appellant gave two different accounts of what had taken 
place that night (Tr.83). But he never once mentioned 
that it was an accident or offered any explanation similar 
to that which he gave in court. Nor was he willing to 
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answer further questions at that time. Instead, at 
the first opportune moment, he slipped out of the 
hospital and fled the state (Tr.163). 
Also, a part of the record is testimony 
establishing appellantfs experience and familiarity 
with firearms (Tr.161). He carried a .45 for three 
years in Vietnam (Tr.161). From this evidence the 
jury could have reasonably believed that a man so 
knowledgeable about guns would not have picked up a 
loaded gun that was cocked (Tr.161) without first 
taking appropriate precautions. 
Also in the record is appellant's own 
testimony that when he fled he took the gun with him 
and later disposed of it (Tr.177). This evidence too 
could reasonably infer guilt or fear of detection on 
the part of appellant. 
The evidence thus presented is sufficient 
to sustain the jury's verdict and the court's ruling 
on appellant's motion. If there is any evidence 
supporting the verdict it must be upheld. Wyatt v. 
Baughman, 121 Utah 98, 239 P.2d 193 (1951)• The 
evidence in this case meets that requirement. The 
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jury was present to hear the testimony and view the 
evidence. Their verdict shows that they believed 
the testimony by Mr. Johansen, Dr. Rich, and others 
who testified of a violent argument, physical 
attack, and calculated threats, which ultimately 
led to an intentional shooting resulting in the 
death of Barbara Ann Owens• It is obvious that 
they did not accept the explanation offered by 
appellant. This is their legal prerogative. 
The evidence is sufficient to support a 
conviction of murder in the second degree and there-
fore, the trial court did not err in denying appellantfs 
motion to acquit. 
POINT II 
REMARKS MADE BY THE PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
IN HIS CLOSING ARGUMENT WERE NOT IMPROPER NOR 
PREJUDICIAL. 
Appellant argues that certain statements 
made by the prosecuting attorney in his closing 
argument were improper, prejudicial and grounds for 
reversal. 
The statements in question concern State's 
Exhibit No. 19. This exhibit is a ripped piece of 
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paisely material, presumably a dress or skirt. It was 
found in a paper sack in the hotel room of the deceased, 
and was admitted into evidence after proper identification 
by the investigating officer, Officer Ferre. Also found 
in the sack and admitted into evidence was a torn 
brassiere (Exhibit No. 18). 
The prosecuting attorney referred to Exhibit 
No. 19 twice during his closing statement to the jury. 
On page 189 of the transcript, Mr. Wootton stated: 
"I've got a torn dress, 
I've got a torn bra, I've got a 
picture of her, and I've got her 
driver's license." 
The second reference is found on page 193: 
"He had beat her for almost an 
hour, apparently very violently. 
All you've got to do is look at the 
marks and look at the torn dress, 
which he didn't mention incidentally, 
According to him she took it off 
herself." 
These two passages are the only mention of the dress (or 
skirt) in Mr. Wootton's closing remarks. 
Appellant claims that the "prosecutor was 
arguing that which was not in evidence. . . . " (refer 
to appellant's brief, page 22). This is obviously not the 
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case. The "skirt" was admitted into evidence by the 
court, after proper identification by Officer Ferre. 
Therefore, references to that article of clothing 
pertained to that which was clearly in evidence, and 
were therefore proper references. 
Appellant also contends that the prosecuting 
attorneyfs arguments "were in no way a good faith 
interpretation of the evidence.1' (Refer to appellant's 
brief, page 22.) 
Counsels have great latitude in their closing 
statements. They may properly interpret and draw any 
reasonable inferences from the evidence. A summation 
of proper attorney conduct in this area is found in 
C.JeS. Vol. 88, § 181: 
"Counsel may state and comment 
on all proper inferences from the 
evidence. . . Counsel is allowed 
latitude in drawing and arguing 
inferences from the evidence, he 
may draw conclusions from the evidence 
on his own system of reasoning, 
although such inferences as stated 
by counsel are inconclusive, improbable, 
illogical, erroneous, or even absurd, 
unless such conclusions are couched 
in language transcending the bounds 
of legitimate argument. Counsel may 
draw an inference from the evidence 
although the inference is contrary to 
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other evidence. However, it is 
improper for counsel to draw 
inferences where there are no 
grounds for them in the evidence, 
or to indulge in denunciations 
based on assumed facts." 
C.J.S. Vol. 88, § 182 states: 
"Counsel may discuss and 
comment on the evidence in his 
argument to the jury. . . Counsel 
should not be subjected to un-
reasonable restraint in commenting 
on the evidence, but should be 
allowed a wide latitude, and the -
scope of permissible argument is 
a matter for the sound discretion 
of the trial judge. . . While 
counsel may properly refer to a 
comment on, evidence adduced by the 
other party, he is not obliged to 
point out evidence which favors 
his opponent, and so may disregard 
any such evidence of an explanatory 
character. . . . " 
The two brief references made by the prosecuting attorney 
were made in good faith and were proper, reasonable 
inferences, drawn from the evidence. The dress was 
clearly in evidence, and a quick examination of the 
clothing reveals that it is indeed "torn." Mr. Johansen 
testified that during the argument, "Billy" ordered the 
woman to "take it off." (Tr.123). One could reasonably 
conclude that the dress was torn during their quarrel. 
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If Mr. Wootton!s comments were improper, as 
appellant claims, the remarks were not prejudicial 
and would not therefore be grounds for reversal. 
C.J.S. 88 § 182 states: 
11
 [A] misstatement of the 
evidence will not be fatal error 
with respect to a matter of 
trifling or of no importance, and 
a mere misrecollection or accidental 
misstatement of evidence in argument 
does not render the trial unfair 
as a matter of law." 
The torn dress was evidence, at most, of a violent 
argument. Other evidence supported this theory—the 
torn bra, the bruises on the deceased's body, and the 
testimony of Mr. Johansen. The reference to the dress 
as "torn," and any inferences drawn from that statement 
were only cumulative or corroborative evidence and 
cannot have prejudiced appellant in any way. 
Nothing the prosecuting attorney said was 
calculated to inflame the jury or prejudice appellant. 
The prosecuting attorney advised the jury: 
"Now I want to caution you as 
I comment on the evidence that the 
things that I'm about to say concerning 
the evidence are not to be considered 
by you as evidence." 
The prosecuting attorney's statements were good faith 
interpretations of the evidence and as such were proper. 
No prejudice has resulted to appellant. 
POINT III 
APPELLANT WAS NOT DENIED A FAIR AND 
IMPARTIAL TRIAL DUE TO JUROR FAMILIARITY 
WITH PROSECUTING WITNESS. 
Appellant claims that he was denied a fair trial 
before an impartial jury. He bases this claim on 
the familiarity of two jurors with two witnesses. 
After the trial began appellant discovered 
that juror Holman was acquainted with Officer Ferre, 
the complaining witness in this case. They had at 
one time lived across the street from one another. 
Mr. Holman,however, moved from Orem, and out of the 
State in 1957, almost twenty years ago. Since that 
time there has been little or no contact between 
them. Mr. Holman testified (Tr. 224): 
"I don't believe we!ve spoken 
three words to one another since 
that time." 
He also testified that there were no close relationships 
between the families, only casual acquaintances far. 224). 
The degree of familiarization existing between 
Mr. Holman and Officer Ferre did not deprive appellant 
of a fair trial as a matter of law. Their relationship 
was not grounds for disqualification. (See Utah Code 
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Ann. i 77-30-19 (1953), as amended. The existence 
of such a relationship, esentially defunct for close 
to twenty years, would be at best, grounds for 
exercising a preemptory challenge. The relationship 
is too extenuated in time, intensity and degree 
to infer bias, as a matter of law. Refer to 
Utah Code Ann. §77-30-19 (1953) as, amended. As a 
matter of fact, Mr. Holman testified that he 
was not influenced by this casual acquaintance but 
based his verdict solely upon the evidence presented 
in court (Tr«225). The trial court did not err 
in denying appellantfs motion for mistrial based on 
the above familiarity. It was a matter within the 
sound discretion of the court and appellant has 
shown no abuse of that discretion. 
The second juror-witness relationship complained 
of is that of Officer Bullock and juror Laursen. 
During a recess in the trial, appellant observed a 
conversation between the two men. The conversation 
was short - the passing of amenities* Mr. Laursen 
and OfficerBullock1s father had once worked at the 
same factory. Mr. Laursen and Officer Bullock were 
not acquainted personally (Tr.222). They had never 
even spoken to one another (Tr.223). Mr. Laursen 
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inquired about the health of Officer Bullock's father. 
Officer Bullock responded to that question. 
This was the extent of their conversation. 
An extensive discussion of juror communication with 
witnesses in a criminal trial, is found in 9 A.L.R. 
3d 1275. It is generally agreed that unauthorized 
conversation between a juror and a witness is improper. 
(See State v. Crank, 105 U. 332, 142 P.2dl78 (1943).) 
Most Courts take the view that unless there is an 
actual showing of prejudice resulting from the 
communication, the conviction should be affirmed not~ 
withstanding the impropriety, (See State v. Mangrum, 
98 Ariz. 279, 403p.2d925 (1965); People v. Aquirref 
158 Cal. App. 2d 304, 322 p. 2d 478 (1958).) Where the 
conversation is affirmatively shown to have been 
unrelated to defendant's case, the cases are nearly 
unanimous that reversal is not required, especially 
where there is only a passing of civilities or similiar 
casual conversation. (See Steiner v. United States, 
229F.-2d745, (Ca. 9, 1956); Miles v. State, 268 P.2d 
290 (1954); People v. Murphy, 107 N.E.2d 748, 412 ill. 
458, (1952); and State v. Johnson, 97 Ariz. 27,. 
396p.2d392 (1964).) 
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The conversation between Mr. Laursen and 
Officer Bullock was unauthorized and improper. It 
is not grounds for a mistrial nor grounds for reversal. 
The conversation was unrelated to the case and 
amounted to a mere passing of civilities. The appellant 
was not therefore prejudiced thereby. 
There is nothing in the record to indicate 
that either juror was influenced by his contact or 
passing acquaintance with a witness. On the 
contrary, the testimony of the jurors themselves 
affirmatively shows that their verdicts had nothing 
whatsoever to do with any familiarity with Officer 
Ferre and Officer Bullock. They based their 
verdicts solely upon the evidence presented in 
court. 
The trial court gave both attorneys ample 
opportunity to question the jurors. It did not deter 
defense counsel "from exploring the matter more 
closely by the judge's hostility to the questions 
and insistence on asking the questions himself." 
(see appellant's brief p. 9) Judge Bullock 
specifically asked Mr. Marsh if he had any further 
questions (Tr. 5). Counsel informed the court 
of the questions he desired to ask and the court 
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addressed those questions to the jury. One question 
asked was: 
" . . . would any of you have 
a predisposition to give more 
credence to a law enforcement 
officer's testimony, a sheriff's 
testimony, say than anyone else 
. . .?" (Tr. 7). 
In response to this question, a prospective juror 
answered that he was acquainted with Officer Ferre 
and Officer Blackhurst. The court questioned the 
juror and cautioned him to be fair and weigh the 
evidence. Mr. Marsh then specifically passed the 
panel (Tr. 8). 
As demonstrated by the recordr defense 
counsel was not deterred by the court in questioning 
the prospective jurors. He was given every opportunity 
to explore any possible biases, prejudices, influencial 
relationships, etc. of the jurors. The court's 
conduct was beyond reproach. 
The testimony of Officer Ferre and Officer 
Bullock raised no factual issues. Their testimony 
was part of a long string of testimony establishing 
an uncontested sequence of events. Neither testified 
on any critical or determinative issues. Their 
testimony could not have resulted in any prejudice 
to the appellant. 
Appellant was not prejudiced in lav/ or in 
fact by any familiarity between any juror and any 
witness and has no grounds for reversal on this point. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN 
DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS THE 
IMPANELED JURY AND TRY THE CASE TO THE 
COURT. 
Midway through the trial, appellant made a 
motion to dismiss the jury and try the case to the 
court alone. His motion was denied. 
It is undisputed that defendant has a con-
stitutional right to a jury trial in criminal cases. 
There is no absolute constitutional nor statutory 
right to try a case to the court alone. The 
Supreme Court in Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 
85 S.Ct.783 (1965) stated; 
" . . . there is no federally 
recognized right to a criminal 
trial before a judge sitting alone, 
but a defendant can, as was held in 
Patton, in some instances waive his 
right to a trial by jury." 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-2 (1953), as amended, 
gives a defendant the right to waive trial by jury, 
in certain cases as spoken in Singer. The court 
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pertaining to that right: 
"The ability to waive a con-
stitutional right does not ordinarily 
carry with it the right to insist upon 
the opposite of the right. For 
example, although a defendant can, 
under some circumstances waive his 
constitutional right to a public trial, 
he has no absolute right to compel a 
private trial. . . . " 
The Court found that a jury trial is the preferable 
mode of trial in a criminal case and that the state 
as well as the defendant has an interest in the type 
of trial had. It therefore upheld a federal rule 
of procedure requiring consent of the court and the 
government before any waiver. Consent is not required 
by the Utah statute. Respondent does not seek to inject 
that which the legislatiure omitted. 
Defendant does have a choice. He may request 
a jury or he may choose instead to try his case 
to the court alone. He has only one choice. He 
cannot exercise that choice and then be allowed to 
change his mind, whenever he perceives it to his 
advantage to do so. 
Appellant in this case chose a jury. The 
jury was impanelled and sworn. Testimony was taken 
and evidence presented. Midway through the trial, 
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appellant changed his mind and tried to waive the 
jury he had previously demanded. He believed that 
his position had changed and his advantage shifted. 
The trial court entertained his motion and heard 
argument from both counsel. The motion was denied. 
The court stated: 
" . . . the defendant does not have 
a federal constitutional right to be 
tried by the court - as he does to be 
tried by a jury. That whether or not 
a jury may be waived and a defendant 
tried by the court is within the 
sound discretion of the court and that 
there was no abuse of discretion in 
this case, particularly in view of the 
fact that the first attempt at a jury 
waiver and trial by the court came 
after the State had presented its 
evidence." (Tr. 97). 
Appellant admittedly has a right to waive 
a jury. Respondent submits that appellant did not 
timely do so, and therefore has no basis to claim any 
error on the part of the court in denying his motion. 
Dismissing the jury midway through the trial would 
require a complete retrial with all of its attendant 
expense and time consuming delay. Appellant should 
not be allowed to demand a jury and then seek reversal 
because he got it. Such shifty tactics take no re-
gard of order. 
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There exists an original choice - the right to 
a jury and the right to waive a jury. The choice 
must be exercised timely and cannot be renegotiated 
Upon the whim of a defendant. 
Appellant based his motion to waive on 
his own opinion that the jury impaneled was not 
an impartial one. The Court, viewed this as an 
improper ground for dismissing the jury. The 
proper motion was a motion for mistrial or motion 
for a new trial. These motions were in fact filed 
prior to appellant's waiver, but were both denied. 
The Court believed the jury to be fair, impartial, 
and unprejudiced by any familiarity with the witnesses. 
An untimely waiver of the jury at that point was 
an attempt to go in the back door. 
Appellant has no constitutional nor statutory 
right to demand a jury, and once he has itf dismiss 
it. He has a right to one or the other, not both. 
It was within the sound discretion of the trial 
court in this situation, to rule on the waiver* 
It did not err in denying appellant's motion. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant was tried by an impartial jury 
and found guilty of second degree murder. The record 
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supports that verdict. The trial court properly 
exercised its discretion in ruling on several motions 
made by appellant during trial and did not err in 
denying those motions. 
Appellant received a fair and impartial trial 
and his conviction should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
EARL F. DORIUS 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
